Draghi’s semi-automatic rifle

A few months ago we commented that Draghi had to threaten to use a bazooka in a similar way to how the SNB does to keep the CHF at acceptable levels for Switzerland. As it happens Draghi wasn’t able to get the Germans to agree to a Swiss style ‘red line’ on yields, but by pledging unlimited firepower, he has made the first real and solid attempt at keeping the Euro zone together since the crisis started.

Also worthy of note is the fact that he has compressed the BTP/Bund and Bono/Bund spreads probably without any meaningful purchase for the time being, but rather relying on the ‘announcement’ effect. Should he need to make sizeable purchases in the future, when the markets will test him (note, when, not if…) he will sterilise the creation of money supply with bill sales, thereby comforting the Bundesbank on the inflation front.

We all know that the Euro zone’s definitive solutions must be political, but by using an umbrella first, with his August pronouncement of ‘we will do all that is necessary’ and with his September unlimited bond purchases pledge, Draghi has gone as close as he could to the bazooka effect. Bravo!

This article was written by Emanuel Arbib – check out the Google+ profile for more updates.

Draghi’s August ECB umbrella

Draghi’s comments at the ECB press conference are yet another attempt to buy time without deploying the bazooka that the markets have been looking for a long time now. However, as unpalatable as it will be to make use of it, it does give Spain and Italy an ultimate parachute should things turn really ugly. This should be seen as a positive development and a clear message that if all else fails, the Euro will be saved when a (fiscally responsible) member state in trouble asks the ECB for assistance, and this will be given.

The problem is still the same, markets will test nations and the ECB to the brink, and this could mean Spain losing market access in the next weeks, at which point the market will test exactly how this ‘bailout of last resort’ works in practice.

The costs of uncertainty

One of the benefits of European monetary integration was going to be the elimination of the uncertainty of the movements in currency rates so as to increase cross-border transactions and create the largest ‘domestic’ market in the world.

In order to remove that uncertainty the architects of the euro have unfortunately created much deeper anxieties and uncertainties. The reality in southern Europe right now is that savers are spending their time trying to protect their wealth from the spectre of bank failures, devaluations, and capital controls. Investors are demanding a high premium to invest in Italian and Spanish bonds, and entrepreneurs have to compete in an open global market with German (and French for the time being) competitors paying a fraction of their cost of capital. These economic distortions pale in comparison with the old threat of a lira or peseta devaluation of yesteryear.

The main point to consider is that these economies, including those like Spain and Italy which are on the path to fiscal consolidation, will never be able to meet their deficit targets with the real economy slowing down and going backwards due to the combined effects of increased taxation, lower disposable incomes, high relative interest rates, and anxiety about the future. The longer it takes to find a real solution, the more painful it will be to solve the issues at hand, without discounting popular discontent which at some point may force a reversion to populist measures.

Mario Monti and the limits of Technocratic governments

Back in November, Monti’s popularity was such that he could have imposed to parliament and to the country measures that would have been impossible to even discuss for the previous governments. His power was not due to the usual honeymoon effect, as here there was no election and no love, only fear of national bankruptcy and the general consensus that if there is someone that can save Italy, it is Super Mario.

Eight months later, the day after parliament finally passed the most complicated bill introduced by Monti (which had to be pushed with repeated confidence votes), the Labour bill, things are quite different. It is possible, even if not likely, that Monti will have tried to pressure his European colleagues at the summit currently underway that unless he comes back home with a tangible result from his list of requests, he will resign. It wouldn’t be an empty threat. Monti knows that his power base, the Italian people, has eroded as Italians have seen the famous ‘spread’ return back near the levels last seen during the last days of Berlusconi’s administration. Simply put, Italians agreed to tighten their belts without too much complaint but were expecting in return to be able to return borrowing at European and not South American rates, to see Italy diverge from not only Greece, but also Spain, Portugal, Cyprus.

Unfortunately, this hasn’t happened and there are two main reasons for this, the first endogenous and the other one exogenous, as Monti himself would have said in his Macroeconomics classes. The exogenous variable is the continuation of the European crisis which sees markets continuing to go after the next perceived weak link. When Spain’s banks got bailed out, Italy’s started appearing in the crosshairs.  Monti is quite appropriately trying to address this by persuading Ms.Merkel that the markets need some short term mechanism that automatically speed-limit the borrowing costs of Italy, Spain and the like to deviate too much from Germany’s.  We will know soon if he succeeds. The internal issue is that Monti’s government ended up watering down its initial promises and has had to acquiesce to the political games in an even greater way as ‘normal’ governments, as he has no constituency in parliament of his own. The main example is the Labour bill: nobody likes it because it didn’t really achieve anything. Ms.Fornero had a historical chance of rewriting the book on Italy’s terrible labour laws but only achieved to change a few footnotes.

A Hot June

June is going to be even warmer than usual, not only in the Med, but across Europe. If the ‘anti-Europe’ parties win the re-vote in Greece, the EU and the ECB in particular will have to unsheathe whatever secret weapons they have prepared in order to prevent the great recession turning into the great depression of the twenty-first century.

There are three main outcomes following a ‘bad’ outcome in Greece. The most likely, but just, is still that the ECB and the EU will step up to the plate and do whatever it takes to keep Greece in the Euro despite the vote. This will have to include agreeing to much softer bailout terms, debt forgiveness, quantitative easing, and other novel weapons.

The second possible outcome is that Greece is allowed to leave the Euro in an ‘orderly’ fashion, i.e. with the cover of many of the same actions described above save of course for the softer bailout. The objective will not be to help Greece but to attempt to stop the rout by the Balkans and prevent a Southern European contagion. This will probably be a short term solution.

The third possibility is that in the context of a disorderly Greek exit, the ‘hard’ countries, led by Germany leave the Euro and adopt some new version of the DMark. This will have the effect of mitigating the depreciation of the ‘leftover Euro’ and of curing the problem of the two speed euro once and for all. Strong countries will adopt the new DM and be under German orbit, while the Med and others will have a ‘weaker’ common currency.

Clearly, all solutions save for one where the Euro remains in its current form with its current members will generate short term disruption in a scale that hasn’t been seen in most people’s living memory.